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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
vs. ; 
JAMES HARLESTON LINDEN, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
) CASE NO. 870389 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appeal stems from a Jury Verdict finding the Defendant 
guilty of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony [U.C.A., section 
76-6-302], Theft, a second degree felony [U.C.A., section 76-6-404], 
and Possession of a Firearm, a third degree felony [U.C.A., section 
76-10-503]. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
U.C.A., section 78-2-2(3)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED OH APPEAL 
The Defendant/Appellant states the following error, on the part 
of the trial court, and issues as grounds for his appeal: 
1. The trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's 
motion for continuance of trial where the trial date was moved up 
some two (2) weeks, the Defendant needed additional time to attempt 
to locate out of state witnesses, and where the Defendant waived his 
speedy trial rights. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion by empaneling 
venireman who were too closely aligned, both through business and 
personal relationships, with the county attorney thus denying the 
Defendant his constitutional rights pursuant to Article I, Sections 
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a three count information with: 1) 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony [U.C.A., section 76-6-302]; 
2) Theft, a second degree felony [U.C.A., section 76-6-404], and; 3) 
Possession of a Firearm, a third degree felony [U.C.A., section 
76-10-503]. 
The charges stem from the robbery of Suttons of Park City, a 
jewelry store in Park City, Utah. 
An individual, allegedly the Defendant, upon entering the 
jewelry store to pick up a necklace left the day before to be 
cleaned, pulled a gun and ordered the clerk of the store to empty all 
items of jewelry into a briefcase. The criminal then fled the store 
locking the clerk in the back room of the store. 
A composite drawing of a suspect was made and Defendant's 
picture was picked out of a photo line-up by the store clerk. 
Several days later the Defendant and another individual 
purchased a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette in Salt Lake City, Utah for in 
excess of $10,000.00 in cash. 
Defendant was eventually apprehended and arraigned on the above 
described charges. The Defendant's Preliminary Hearing was held on 
June 16, 1987 before the Honorable Maurice D. Jones; the Defendant 
was bound over to stand trial in the District Court on all charges. 
<R«*> 
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Defendant was tried before a jury in Coalville, Utah on 
September 9 and 10, 1987 before District Judge Homer F. Wilkinson. 
After hearing the testimony and being instructed by the Judge, 
the jury retired for a total of 7 1/2 minutes before returning its 
verdict of guilty on all three charges. 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
1. Pursuant to Defendant's Motion for Continuance and after 
weighing and balancing the Constitutional rights of the Defendant, to 
summons witnesses in his behalf at trial, against the prejudice 
created by delaying the Defendant's trial, the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying defendant's motion for continuance. This was an 
abuse of discretion because Defendant's trial date was moved up some 
two (2) weeks, the Defendant needed additional time to attempt to 
locate out of state witnesses, the Defendant waived his speedy trial 
rights and the State would suffer no prejudice by the delay. 
2. The trial court abused its discretion by empaneling 
venireman who were too closely aligned, both through business and 
personal relationships, with the county attorney thus denying the 
Defendant his constitutional rights pursuant to Article I, Sections 
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. Of the 23 member jury panel, nine stated 
on voir dire that they had previous business and/or personal 
relationships with the County Attorney trying the case for the State, 





THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL 
Defendant filed a Motion for Continuance of Trial (R«J7-^ S) 
requesting that the September 9, 1987 trial date be continued so as 
to allow him to contact several out of state witnesses to testify on 
his behalf. Defendant alleges that he was not able to this due to 
his incarceration in the Salt Lake County Jail and limited phone 
access, and due to his trial date being moved up by some two weeks. 
(R3o^3uX). Further, the Defendant was willing to waive his speedy 
trial rights and detainer time. (RW6^9) 
The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska in the case of SALAZAR 
v. STATE. 559 P.2d 66 (Alaska, 1976) stated that: "...while there is 
no well established standard for determining when a denial [of a 
motion for continuance of trial] has been arbitrary, we are not 
without guidelines for making such a determination. ...the primary 
focus of inquiry must be on the reason for the requested continuance. 
We now articulate additional factors which are among those that the 
trial Court should consider on a request to enable a party to secure 
further testimony.... 1) Whether the testimony is material to the 
case; 2) whether the testimony can be elicited from any other source; 
3) whether the testimony is cumulative; 4) probability of securing 
the absent witness in a reasonable time; 5) whether the requesting 
party was diligent and acting in good faith; 6) the inconvenience of 
the courts and/or others; 7) the likelihood that the testimony would 
have affected the jury's verdict." (at pg. 72) 
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These are factors which the trial court ih this present case 
should have looked at but did not. If the Court had looked at these 
factors it would have been clear that the Defendant was requesting a 
continuance of the trial date for one main reason - to be allowed 
time to contact his witnesses and secure their presence at the time 
of trial. 
When this situation is combined with the fact that the 
transcripts of the preliminary hearing were not delivered to 
counsel's office until the night before trial (Rl36/*j6) and that the 
trial date was moved up some two (2) weeks (R3c>^ 33l ), Defendant's 
request for a continuance of the trial date was timely, for good 
cause, and the denial of the motion for continuance infringes on the 
Defendant's constitutional rights guaranteed under the Utah state and 
Federal Constitutions. the Defendant was deprived of an opportunity 
to present testimony material to his defense. (BANKS v. STATE. 710 
P.2d 723; Nevada, 1985; CQLGAIN v. STATE. 719 P.2d 1263; Nevada, 
1986) 
PQIHT II, 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EMPANELING 
VENIREMAN WHO WERE TOO CLOSELY ALIGNED, BOTH THROUGH 
BUSINESS AND PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, WITH THE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY 
It is a well accepted legal principle, guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, that an individual is entitled to 
a fair and impartial jury trial by one's peers. 
The jury empaneled in the Appellant's case, by its mere 
composition of individuals who were too closely aligned with the 
County Attorney through business and personal relationships, on its 
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face denies the Defendant of these constitutional rights. 
The concept upon which the Defendant relies in this case is best 
stated in STATE v. BROOKS. 563 P.2d 789 (Utah, 1977): "Article I, 
Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah, in mandatory terms, 
guarantees the accused in a criminal proceeding the right to a trial 
by an impartial jury. 'Impartiality' is not a technical concept but 
is a state of mind; it is a mental attitude of appropriate 
indifference. A jury, in its role as fact finder, must weigh the 
evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. A juror, who 
through a personal association with a witness or a party has 
developed a relationship of affection, respect, or esteem, cannot be 
deemed disinterested, indifferent, impartial. ...A juror is not in 
any position to weigh the evidence of his friend against the evidence 
of strangers and of the defendant so as to strike a balance between 
them as the law requires.... Where there have been personal 
associations, such as the ones here; to remain uninfluenced, 
unbiased, and unprejudiced, runs counter to human nature." (at pgs. 
801-802) 
This is the disagreement that the Defendant has with the jury 
venire and jury panel in his case - the personal and professional 
relationships with the County Attorney were of such a nature that 
"...to remain uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced, runs counter 
to human nature." As such, Defendant was denied a trial by a fair 
and impartial jury. 
In support of this argument, the record would show that : 1) 
Nine of the 23 members of the jury panel claimed they knew the County 
Attorney (i.e. Ward Member, Son's Coach, Performed legal work for 
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spouse, County Attorney's doctor, etc.). Of these Nine, three were 
seated on the jury including Juror No. 3 who was a fellow Ward Member 
and Juror No. 16 who son was coached by the County Attorney; 2) One 
of the Jury members, No. 16, knows two (2) of the police witnesses; 
3) Ten of the 23 members of the jury panel, three of whom were seated 
on the jury, had been victims of thefts. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY 
In violation of the Defendant's rights guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, sections 
10 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, Defendant supplements the 
argument set forth above under Point II by pointing out that the jury 
deliberated only seven and one half (7 1/2 minutes) which was not 
even sufficient time to read the 26 Jury Instructions upon which they 
were to base their deliberations. 
This buttresses the arguments made above under Point II that "A 
juror is not in any position to weigh the evidence of his friend 
against the evidence of strangers and of the defendant so as to 
strike a balance between them as the law requires.... Where there 
have been personal associations, such as the ones here; to remain 




For the foregoing grounds, and based upon the foregoing 
arguments, Appellant requests that this Court: 
1. Reverse the Defendant's convictions; 
2* Remand the case to the district Court for a new trial 
consistent with the Supreme Court's findings* 
Dated this 9th day of May, 1988. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
( 
INE, Attorney for 
fendant 
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